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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This Court has already determined that ,1»'' )rder from wl" h 
Mr. Godfrey appeals constitutes a final judgment and that jurisdiction is proper. (See 
Order Withdrawing Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by entering the ultimate discovery sanction 
of default judgment against Mr. Godfrey when: (1) Mr. Godfrey, in fact, complied with 
the discovery requests by producing documents relating to him personally; (2) he, as well 
as employees of the other defendant, The Beehive House, made diligent, good-faith 
efforts to locate and produce the bank records requested of The Beehive House; (3) the 
documents not produced were those of The Beehive House and not of Mr. Godfrey 
personally; (4) the method by which the documents were requested was not procedurally 
correct; and (5) the trial court never ordered Mr. Godfrey to produce the documents at 
issue, even though its sanction of default judgment was based on the incorrect assumption 
that it had. (R. at 461-66.) 
The standard of review for imposition of discovery sanctions is abuse of 
discretion. See Preston & Chambers. P.C. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
It should be noted, however, that "[w]hen the sanction imposed is that of a default 
judgment, the most severe of sanctions, the trial court's range of discretion is more 
1 
narrow than when the court is imposing less severe sanctions." Utah Dept. of Transp. v. 
Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rule 30(b)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 34(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 37(b)(2)(A through C), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 37(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Copies are set forth in the Addendum) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a dispute over whether defendant S. Chad Godfrey is obligated 
to repay in full certain funds given him by the plaintiff. (R. at 1-32, 71-85.) During the 
proceedings below, the trial court entered default judgment against Mr. Godfrey, for the 
entire amount plaintiff claimed in her Complaint, as a discovery sanction because the 
other defendant, The Beehive House, was unable, after good-faith efforts, to locate certain 
of its bank records prior to a scheduled deposition. (R. at 461-64; R. at 548, pp. 15-20.) 
Whether the trial court erred in entering said default judgment is the issue in this appeal. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Based on plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Make Discovery, the trial 
court struck the pleadings of Mr. Godfrey and entered default judgment against him for 
2 
approximately $490,000 00 < Rl1, : «11 » 2 5 2 1 ,< 1-61 6 1 ) I"11* Ii G< i ifi c > 1 in iel> filed J i l 4< >tic< 
of Appeal from that judgmeni ; at 465-67.) Claims still remain against The Beehive 
House. (R. at 461-64.) 
This Court filed a Sua Sponte Motion to Dismiss, which it later withdrew based on 
the fact that the natiii e of tl le issues oi i appeal d-f' , •- r-.;!:-r!\ '^.\o 
facts of the remaining claims. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1 On November 29, 1995, plaintiff filed her Verified Complaint in this action, 
naming as defendants The Beehive House, a Utah '* ^ ' -•' " • = -*!-<hip J s rivi.i 
Godfrey, an individual who, during the relevant period of this litigation, was employed as 
the marketing director of Beehive Health, Inc., an affiliated company of The Beehive 
House. (R. at 1-9, 323; R. at 548, p. 
.2. Ot I i. \ i igust 7, iyyC ioi i lotice to Bi ad N lerrill, who served as 
counsel for both defendants at that time, plaintiff noticed the deposition of Mr. Godfrey 
for August 19, 1996. (R. at 117, 141-42.) The Notice of Deposition included a request 
that Mr. Godfrey bring certaii I doci n i lei its tc tl le depositioi i (R at 86-88.) \, cop> of tl le 
Notice of the August 19, 1996 Deposition is attached hereto in Addendum "B".) 
3. Together with the Notice of Deposition, plaintiffs counsel delivered a letter 
to Mr. Merrill that stated: "If August 19th creates a problem for you, please let me know; 
however, we would like to complete the deposition as soon r*>>^ > 
3 
4. After receiving the Notice of Deposition and the letter, Mr. Merrill 
contacted plaintiffs counsel and informed him, as he had done several times prior, that 
Mr. Godfrey was out of state and would not be able to return until at least the middle of 
September, 1996. Mr. Merrill explained that Mr. Godfrey's whereabouts were 
confidential,1 but that he would nonetheless be available for deposition the following 
month. (R. at 117, 142.) 
5. Plaintiffs counsel refused to postpone the deposition in spite of Mr. 
Merrill's representation that Mr. Godfrey would be available in September, 1996. (R. at 
117, 142.) 
6. On August 15, 1996, Mr. Merrill again contacted plaintiffs counsel and 
explained that because his wife was prematurely in labor and hospitalized, he would not 
be able to file a Motion for Protective Order before the noticed deposition date. 
Plaintiffs counsel agreed to allow Mr. Merrill at least an extra week to file such a motion 
or to reach some other resolution of the dispute. Plaintiffs counsel stated that, in any 
event, he had already canceled the deposition arrangements for August 19. (R. at 118, 
142-43.) 
7. On August 20, 1996, upon returning to work, Mr. Merrill contacted 
plaintiffs counsel in an attempt to resolve the scheduling of Mr. Godfrey's deposition. 
1
 Mr. Godfrey was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary at the time. For a variety of 
obvious personal reasons, Mr. Godfrey wanted to keep that fact as private as possible. (R. at 
548, p. 13.) 
4 
Mr. Merrill again explained that Mr. Godfrey would not be available until at least the 
middle of September 1996, but that, to provide assurances of this, 1\ It, Godfrey i \ 01 lid 
agree to ^lipiiliH'11'* «i "' , l ' ' " » ' « p i " "' IMI " deposition ;ii tint Iinic. sanctions would 
be entered against him. No agreement, however, was reached. (R. at 118, 143.) 
8 Without any further contact, plaintiffs counsel delivered a proposed 
Stipulation to Mr. Merrill nil August 11. llWo I lie Mipiiltihon proposed lti.il Mr. 
Godfrey would be deposed on September 12, 1996, and that if he did not appear, both he 
and The Beehive House would agree to default judgment against them. (R. at 118-19, 
136-39, 143.) 
9 1 Ipon receiving the proposed Stipulation, I h I Ii'i i ill lelrpliMnui plaintiffs 
counsel and explained that Mr. Godfrey would not be available until September 19, 1996. 
Mr. Merrill also explained that The Beehive House would not stipulate to default 
judgment against it should Mr. Godfrey not appear at his deposition because The Beehive 
House had no control ove -v.*: v ' : i. • vas 
otherwise agreeable, but that if these issues were not resolved, he would need to seek a 
protective order. (R. at 119, 143.) 
10. On August 26, 1996, plainlitf \ counsel d d i u in d a leltei slating llul 
although he would agree to depose Mr. Godfrey on September 20, plaintiff would not 
agree to delete from the proposed Stipulation the provision for default judgment against 
5 
The Beehive House in the event Mr. Godfrey did not attend his deposition. (R. at 120, 
140, 144.) 
11. Upon receiving the August 26, 1996 letter, Mr. Merrill again informed 
plaintiffs counsel that The Beehive House would not agree to judgment against it based 
on someone else's conduct. Mr. Merrill suggested that the parties should nevertheless 
proceed with Mr. Godfrey's deposition because they had finally agreed to a date, and that, 
in the unlikely event Mr. Godfrey did not appear, plaintiff could then move for sanctions 
against The Beehive House and allow The Beehive House an opportunity to respond. (R. 
at 120, 144.) 
12. On the morning of August 28, 1996, plaintiffs counsel faxed a letter to 
Mr. Merrill stating that plaintiff had elected to pursue a Motion for Sanctions against both 
Mr. Godfrey and The Beehive House. Before Mr. Merrill was able to file a motion for a 
protective order on behalf of the defendants, plaintiffs counsel served the Motion for 
Sanctions on Mr. Merrill at approximately 11:00 a.m. that same day. (R. at 120-21, 144.) 
13. Despite the facts outlined above, plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions was based 
solely on the grounds that Mr. Godfrey did not appear at the deposition originally 
scheduled for August 19, 1996 (which plaintiffs counsel himself admitted he had 
canceled), and that Mr. Godfrey failed to file a motion for a protective order. (R. at 100-
01, 118, 142-43.) 
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In plaintiff s Motion for Sanctions and accompanying i i: lei i lorandi 11 i: i, i 10 
ment: y• <-t< f the above-described negotiations between counsel nor of the 
agreement to depose Mr. Godfrey on September 20, 1996. (R. at 99-113.) 
15, On March 28, 1997, plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions came on for hearing 
before the trial com t A t tl le 1 leai ii ig, tl I i ]:: arties agree d tl lat f Ii Godfre} w as available 
and that his deposition would be taken forthwith. (R. at 546, pp. 2-6.) In an Order dated 
April 21, 1997, the court imposed as sanctions against Mr. Godfrey the attorneys' fees 
and costs plaintiff incurred in connection with the Motion i . anci i ) 
No order was issued compelling Mr, ><lfj' • ^m^ t ! iL , documents, i^v. ai 217-18.) 
A copy of the court's April 21, 1997 Order is attached hereto in Addendum "B".) 
16. Thereafter, on June 4, 1997, plaintiff filed a Notice of Deposition 
scheduling Mr. Godfrey's depositioi i Un 1111 \ I I I "l[ < / '" 11 n N o I i a , 11 %i»\L I H H 1111 r 11 1111 
deposition of B. Ralph Godfrey, a representative of The Beehive House, for July 10, 
1997. The Notice requested that these deponents bring certain documents to their 
depositions uto the extent such documents [were] in their possession or under their 
control or [wei *; herwise accessibj ..» i)»( -.mr.?. was bank 
records, statements, canceled checks, etc., of The Beehive House (the "Bank Records"). 
(R. at 221-23.) A copy of the second Notice of Deposition is attached hereto in 
Addendum "B". 
; 
17. Upon receipt of the second Notice of Deposition, Mr. Godfrey and various 
employees of The Beehive House searched diligently for the documents requested. Their 
efforts, as more fully described in the Argument section below, included several searches 
for the Bank Records of the Beehive House that had been placed in storage and 
subsequently moved to different locations. (R. at 314-29.) In addition, The Beehive 
House issued a subpoena to its bank, requesting copies of the Bank Records. (R. at 548, 
p. 16.) Despite these efforts, The Beehive House was unable to locate the bank records 
plaintiff had requested.2 (R. at 315-18.) 
18. At the appointed time on July 11, 1997, Mr. Godfrey was at the premises 
where the deposition was scheduled, awaiting the instruction to come to the specific room 
where the deposition was being conducted. His counsel appeared and delivered to 
plaintiffs counsel all the documents Mr. Godfrey had been able to locate responsive to 
the requests directed to him.3 The Beehive House also appeared with all the documents it 
was able to locate. Mr. Godfrey was prepared to be sworn and deposed. Plaintiffs 
counsel, however, chose not to depose Mr. Godfrey at that time, opting instead to review 
the documents he had brought with him and await production of The Beehive House's 
bank records before deposing Mr. Godfrey. (R. at 315, 324.) 
2During the time Mr. Godfrey was imprisoned, he exercised no control over and had 
nothing to do with the documents plaintiff requested. (R. at 315, 324.) 
3At this point, Mr. Godfrey had retained the Snow, Christensen & Martineau as separate 
counsel. The Beehive House was still represented by Mr. Merrill. Mr. Merrill has subsequently 
withdrawn because of conflicts. The Beehive House is now represented by Dennis K. Poole. 
8 
1*1 in in Ilnilll, I  I [l"' ,i ', | i l , i n i l i l l I i l i (III ,i M n l i i u i l o r S u n c t i o n s l o i i i i i l u i r In M a k e 
Discovery against both The Beehive House and Mr. Godfrey on the ground that they had 
not produced all the documents requested. (R. at 225-26.) In response to plaintiffs 
Motion, Mr. Godfrey asserted that he had in fact produced all the requested documents he 
c •. l that were in: I 1 lis possessio1 * M ) ' . 
20. This second Motion for Sanctions came on for hearing before the trial court 
on September 4, 1997. (see Transcript of Hearing, R. at 548, pp. 1-42, a copy of which is 
attached hereto in Addendum e hearing, the tn ...... ff s 
Motion and authorized sanctions against both defendants. 
21. In its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Make 
Discovery, dated November 18, 1997 (the "Default Order"), the trial court struck the 
pleadings of Mr. Godfrey and ei ite i ed defai ill: ji ldgi i lei it agaii ist liin l foi the following 
sums: (a) $381,700.00, representing the principal amount of plaintiff s claim; 
(b) $109,322.30, representing prejudgment interest through September 15, 1997; (c) 
$170.00, representing plaintiffs costs; and (d) postjudgment interest on the foregoing 
amounts un - •• > n full. (R at < 161 6 1 ) " cop> of tl le Defai lit Order , froi n w 1 licl l lv tr. 
Godfrey appeals, is attached hereto in Addendum "B". 
22. In imposing the sanction of default judgment against Mr. Godfrey, the trial 
court relied heavil; -he assumption that it had pi e\ ioi isl> oi dei ed 1"\ li Godfrey to 
produce the missing documents ; * Godfrey was under a continuing obligation, 
9 
pursuant to the original Notice of Deposition filed in August 1996, to produce the records 
in question. (R. at 548, pp. 28-29, 33-34.) No such order was in place, however. The 
trial court had simply ordered the deposition to be rescheduled. (R. at 217-220; R. at 546, 
pp. 1-10.) In addition, the August 1996 Notice of Deposition simply requested that Mr. 
Godfrey bring certain documents to his deposition, which did not occur and which 
Plaintiffs counsel himself canceled. (R. at 86-89; 118, 142-43.) 
23. Pursuant to the trial court's Default Order, The Beehive House again 
undertook to locate the documents. After extensive efforts, The Beehive House located 
the documents and produced them to the plaintiff. 
24. On December 17, 1997, Mr. Godfrey filed a Notice of Appeal of the 
Default 1997 Order and as to the default judgment entered against him. (R. at 465-66.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in entering the most severe sanction of default 
judgment against Mr. Godfrey. First, it was improper to enter default judgment against 
Mr. Godfrey for the failure of the other defendant, The Beehive House, to produce its 
bank records. Mr. Godfrey did not have control over or possess the bank records; The 
Beehive House did. Moreover, Mr. Godfrey produced all the documents he was able to 
locate that were responsive to the requests directed to him, personally. 
In addition, the trial court's decision to enter default judgment against Mr. Godfrey 
was based on a number of incorrect assumptions and procedural flaws. For instance, 
10 
contrary to the trial court's belief, there was no prior order in place compelling Mr. 
Godfrey to produce the records requested. Plaintiffs first Notice of Deposition merely 
requested that Mr. Godfrey bring certain documents to his deposition. Plaintiffs counsel 
canceled that deposition, and there was no continuing obligation on Mr. Godfrey to 
produce anything. Furthermore, at the hearing on plaintiffs first Motion for Sanctions, 
the trial court did not set a specific date by which Mr. Godfrey was to produce the 
requested records; rather, the court simply stated that his deposition needed to be 
rescheduled, which it was. Thus, the only obligation of Mr. Godfrey was to attend his 
July 11, 1997 deposition with the documents he could locate. The documents were 
produced and delivered to plaintiffs counsel, and Mr. Godfrey was prepared to be sworn 
in and deposed. Nonetheless, the trial court entered the most severe discovery sanction 
against him. It was an abuse of discretion to do so. 
ARGUMENT 
"[D]efault judgment is an unusually harsh sanction that should be meted out with 
caution." Darrington v. Wade. 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Entry of default 
judgment as a discovery sanction requires a showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault, 
such as the intentional failure to comply with a court order compelling discovery. See 
Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995). Judgments by default 
"are disfavored by the law," and whenever possible, cases should be decided on the 
merits. Wright v. Wright. 941 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
11 
In Utah, the trial court has discretion to select which discovery sanction to impose. 
That wide grant of power is abused, however, if there is "'an erroneous conclusion of law 
or no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.'" Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 
938 P.2d 271, 274-75 (Utah 1997) (citing Askew v. Hardman. 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 
1996)). In this case, for the reasons set forth below, the trial court's selection of default 
judgment as a discovery sanction against Mr. Godfrey was based on several erroneous 
conclusions of law, misperceptions of the evidence, and incorrect recollections of the 
record. It was therefore an abuse of discretion to enter any sanction against Mr. Godfrey, 
particularly the ultimate sanction of default judgment. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DEFAULT-
ING MR. GODFREY FOR THE INABILITY OF THE OTHER 
DEFENDANT. THE BEEHIVE HOUSE. TO LOCATE THE 
BANK RECORDS. 
Default judgment should not be entered against one defendant for another 
defendant's inability to timely locate requested documents. 
In spite of this simple principle, in the present case, the trial court entered default 
judgment against Mr. Godfrey when it was The Beehive House's bank records at issue. 
These two defendants are separate. (R. at 323; R. at 548, p. 20.) At the September 4, 
1997 hearing on plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, counsel for the defendants emphasized 
that the bank records which had not been produced were in the "possession, custody and 
control of the Beehive House"—not Mr. Godfrey. (R. at 548, p. 15.) The bank records in 
question were stored and maintained by the Beehive House. In addition, throughout the 
12 
relevant period, Mr. Godfrey was incarcerated out of state; he obviously did not work at 
The Beehive House during that time, nor did he have access to the documents at issue. 
(R. at 548, pp. 17, 20.) In fact, The Beehive House, recognizing its responsibility to 
locate the bank records prior to the July 11, 1997 deposition date, subpoenaed its bank for 
copies of the bank statements. (R. at 548, p. 16.) 
At one point during the hearing, the trial court seemed to recognize that it was the 
responsibility of The Beehive House, not Mr. Godfrey, to produce the bank records. The 
court stated, "All right. And at the time that the requests were made for the documents, 
that the documents, whatever documents there were, were at the—under the control of the 
Beehive House; isn't that correct?" (R. at 548, p. 18.) Nonetheless, in issuing its ruling, 
the court explained that default would be entered against Mr. Godfrey because he had not 
"requested or subpoenaed documents from the bank himself. He's relied on the Beehive 
House to do his work for him." (R. at 548, p. 34.). 
The court contradicted itself: The defendants were requested to produce those 
documents that were within their respective possession or control; the Beehive House had 
control over and maintained the Bank Records, which were in fact bank records of the 
Beehive House and not of Mr. Godfrey; the Beehive House undertook to find and 
produce the Bank Records; yet the court sanctioned Mr. Godfrey for relying on the 
Beehive House to produce the Bank Records and for not issuing a subpoena for the 
records himself. 
13 
The logic of the ruling is even more perplexing, and further reveals that the court 
abused its discretion, in light of the court's subsequent statement. In explaining the 
decision to impose attorneys fees and costs as sanctions against The Beehive House, the 
trial court stated, "I'm also troubled by the fact that the Beehive House allowed a 
nonemployee to search for the records, and a codefendant in the case, and have [sic] not 
maintained 100 percent control over the documents in question." (R. at 548, p. 38.) 
Thus, in the span of one hearing, the trial court sanctioned Mr. Godfrey for not searching 
for The Beehive House's Bank Records, and then sanctioned the Beehive House for 
allowing Mr. Godfrey to search for those same records. According to the trial court's 
logic, no matter what the defendants did, they would be sanctioned. Defendants should 
not be placed in such an impossible conundrum. This, by itself, demonstrates that the 
court abused its discretion. 
Mr. Godfrey was under no duty to produce the Bank Records of The Beehive 
House. Rule 34 clearly indicates that a party's responsibility is to produce only those 
documents in the party's "possession, custody, or control." The Bank Records were 
documents pertaining solely to The Beehive House, not to Mr. Godfrey. Accordingly, the 
trial court erred in sanctioning him for failing to produce them. 
In Cochran Consulting. Inc. v. Uwatec USA. Inc., 102 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1996), 
the Federal Circuit faced a similar situation and reversed the district court's imposition of 
discovery sanctions. There, Uwatec, the defendant in a patent infringement case, was 
14 
served with document requests seeking the computer code for the allegedly infringing 
device. Uwatec did not own the code, but under threat of sanctions from the district 
court, it sued Dynatec, the purported owner of the code in Switzerland in order to 
establish ownership. The Swiss court ruled against Uwatec and held that Dynatec was the 
sole owner of the code. In spite of this ruling, the district court in the patent litigation 
imposed harsh injunctive sanctions anyway. 
In reversing, the Federal Circuit explained that "[i]n imposing upon Uwatec ... the 
duty to produce the [computer] code although they did not possess it and had no right to 
obtain it, the district court applied incorrect legal standards." Id. at 1230. The circuit 
court first reviewed Uwatec's good faith efforts to obtain and produce the code, including 
filing suit against the author of the code in a foreign country. Second, the circuit court 
reviewed the simple standard of Rule 34, which requires that before sanctions may be 
imposed, a party must have "ownership, custody, or control" of a requested document. 
"Control" is then defined "not only as possession but as the legal right to obtain the 
documents requested upon demand." Id at 1229-30. Because Uwatec ultimately had no 
right to the computer code, it had no ownership or control. Without such control, the 
circuit court therefore held that it would be impossible for Uwatec to produce the code. 
Because "Rule 37 is not a legal requirement to do the impossible," the court vacated the 
sanctions. 
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The present case is similar. Mr. Godfrey and The Beehive House undertook good 
faith efforts to locate and produce the Bank Records. More importantly, Mr. Godfrey was 
under no duty to produce those records. He lacked the legal right to obtain those 
documents, upon demand, from either The Beehive House or its bank. The trial court 
emphasized that fact when it reprimanded The Beehive House for allowing Mr. Godfrey 
to assist in the search. The trial court also implied that Mr. Godfrey had a duty to 
subpoena the Bank Records directly from The Beehive House's bank. The plaintiff could 
have just as easily done this and obtained the information it sought through alternative 
means. The trial court lacked the authority to compel Mr. Godfrey to produce the Bank 
Records, to sanction him for failing to produce them, or to sanction him with default 
judgment. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT MISPERCEIVED THE EVIDENCE 
BEFORE IT: MR. GODFREY DID NOT ENGAGE IN CONDUCT 
WARRANTING ANY SANCTIONS. LET ALONE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT. 
There was no factual or evidentiary basis warranting the severe sanction of default 
judgment against Mr. Godfrey. He made good-faith discovery efforts and produced the 
documents within his possession and control. 
The type of conduct for which default judgment as a discovery sanction has been 
affirmed is well illustrated in Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 
1995). In that case, the defendant failed numerous times to respo i.i to discovery requests, 
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even after promising on many different occasions to comply by certain dates. The 
plaintiff made several formal discovery demands, but the defendant did nothing. After 
nine months of such noncompliance, the plaintiff moved to compel discovery responses. 
The motion was served on the defendant, but he did not respond. Three weeks later, the 
plaintiff filed a notice to submit the motion to compel for decision and a proposed order. 
These documents were also served on the defendant, but he again failed to respond. The 
court thus granted the motion and sent a copy of the order compelling discovery to the 
defendant. Nearly seven months later, the defendant still had not answered the discovery 
requests and, as a result, the plaintiff moved to strike the defendant's pleadings and enter 
default. The motion, coupled with the prior order compelling discovery, was served on 
the defendant, but with no response. A few weeks later, the plaintiff filed a memorandum 
in support of its motion to strike, a notice to submit the motion, and a proposed order. All 
of these documents were served on the defendant, but again he made no response. 
Finally, over a year and a half after the initial discovery requests were served on the 
defendant, default judgment was entered against him. See 892 P.2d at 5; see also Morton 
v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271, 272-73 (Utah 1997) (describing similar 
nonresponsive and dilatory tactics which provided adequate basis for entry of default 
judgment as a discovery sanction). 
In no manner does the conduct of Mr. Godfrey resemble that of the nonresponsive 
parties in either Osguthorpe or Morton. Plaintiffs first discovery request of Mr. Godfrey 
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was in the form of a Notice of Deposition, dated August 7, 1996, which requested that he 
bring certain documents to his deposition scheduled for August 19, 1996. Mr. Godfrey, 
however, was incarcerated in a federal prison at that time. Although plaintiff was not 
informed of the reason for Mr. Godfrey's unavailability, Mr. Godfrey's counsel engaged 
in good-faith negotiations with plaintiffs counsel to postpone the deposition to a 
mutually feasible time. The fact that Mr. Godfrey could not be deposed in August 1996 
was not concealed at all; in fact, just when it appeared that counsel for both parties had 
agreed to depose Mr. Godfrey in late September of that year, plaintiff filed her first 
Motion for Sanctions. 
That motion was based on the fact that Mr. Godfrey was not deposed on August 
19, 1996, as originally scheduled, and on the fact that Mr. Godfrey had not moved for a 
protective order. The motion was indeed unexpected: not only did Mr. Godfrey's 
counsel believe the parties had agreed not to pursue the August 19 deposition, but 
plaintiffs counsel had expressly stated prior to that date that he had canceled the 
arrangements for that deposition. 
Moreover, Mr. Godfrey's counsel had stated several times that if an agreement was 
not reached concerning the situation, he would need to seek a protective order. Knowing 
this, plaintiffs counsel nonetheless filed the Motion for Sanctions the same morning he 
notified Mr. Godfrey's counsel that he would be pursuing sanctions rather than 
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continuing the negotiations. Mr. Godfrey was in effect ambushed, and had no 
opportunity to seek a protective order. 
While one might argue Mr. Godfrey should have allowed his whereabouts at that 
time to be disclosed, it can hardly be said that he wilfully and in bad faith frustrated the 
judicial process. Through his counsel, Mr. Godfrey simply sought to reschedule his 
deposition to a date when he would be available, which was shortly after the deposition 
date originally designated. Nonetheless, the trial court relied heavily on Mr. Godfrey's 
nonappearance at the originally scheduled deposition in determining later that default 
judgment against him was warranted. (R. at 548, pp. 28-29, 33-34.) 
When Mr. Godfrey returned to Utah in November 1996, counsel for both parties 
had agreed discovery would be postponed until after the Motion for Sanctions had been 
decided. (R. at 548, pp. 19-20, 27.) The motion was argued March 28, 1997, and the 
order assessing costs and attorneys' fees against Mr. Godfrey was entered April 21, 1997. 
Soon thereafter, on June 4, 1997, plaintiff filed another Notice of Deposition, which 
scheduled a deposition for Mr. Godfrey and The Beehive House on July 11, 1997. The 
Notice requested that Mr. Godfrey bring certain documents to his deposition. The Notice 
also requested that The Beehive House bring documents, including the Bank Records. 
Pursuant to the Notice, Mr. Godfrey located and produced all the documents in his 
possession or control that pertained to him personally. In addition, he helped The 
Beehive House in its good-faith efforts to locate the Bank Records. Mr. Godfrey 
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personally searched for the documents and instructed various employees to search 
through all records and files to locate them. (R. at 323-34.) 
More specifically, in the middle of June 1997, Mr. Godfrey asked DeeAnn 
Schaugaard, Office Manager of The Beehive House, to locate the Bank Records. (R. at 
324, 335-36.) Schaugaard earlier had placed the Bank Records in a box and moved them 
to the office of Beehive Home Health, Inc., a company affiliated with The Beehive 
House. (R. at 335.) 
The box with the Bank Records remained at Beehive Home Health from March 
1997, until approximately May 1997. (R. at 335.) Some time during May 1997, the Bank 
Records and numerous other boxes of documents were moved to a storage facility. 
Schaugaard, together with several others moved numerous boxes of records and 
documents to the storage facility. Schaugaard taped closed the box containing the Bank 
Records, affixed an identifying label, and moved the box out of the office of Beehive 
Home Health. (R. at 253-55, 257, 273, 335-36.) 
When Mr. Godfrey asked Schaugaard to locate the bank records in June 1997, she 
was not overly concerned with immediately locating them because she assumed they 
would be readily accessible at the storage facility. (R. at 336.) Prior to the end of June 
1997, Schaugaard asked Ralph Godfrey to retrieve the box containing the bank records. 
She described the box and its label. Ralph Godfrey however was unable to find the Bank 
Records. (R. at 253-57, 273, 336.) 
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Prior to the end of June 1997, Schaugaard also requested Mary Woodland, an 
employee of the Beehive House, to retrieve the Bank Records. Schaugaard described the 
box, but Ms. Woodland was also unable to locate it. (R. at 336.) 
Shortly after that time, Schaugaard left on vacation, returning to work on July 10, 
1997--the day before the records were to be produced. (R. at 336.). Mr. Godfrey 
immediately requested that Schaugaard search all possible locations for the Bank 
Records. (R. at 336.) Schaugaard, with the help of Mr. Godfrey and Ralph Godfrey, 
searched The Beehive House, the Beehive Home Health corporate office, the storage 
facility, and other locations. The search continued well into the evening of July 10, 1997. 
(R. at 253-57, 273, 336.) Notwithstanding all of the foregoing efforts, the Bank Records 
were not found prior to July 11, 1997.4 (R. at 337.) 
These facts reveal that both Mr. Godfrey and The Beehive House undertook 
diligent efforts to locate the Bank Records prior to the date of the scheduled deposition, 
but were simply unable to find them at that time. There is no evidence of destruction, 
fraud, or purposeful concealment as is generally required to uphold entry of default 
judgment as a discovery sanction. See, e.g.. Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 515 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (upholding default judgment against defendant where he actively 
mislead the court and the opposing party by secreting approximately $180,000 of his 
4
 After extensive efforts, The Beehive House subsequently located the Bank Records 
and produced them to the plaintiff. 
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income while insisting to the court he lacked funds to pay additional child support); see 
also Moore's Federal Practice 3D, § 37.50[2][b] (1998) ("[D]efault sanctions are likely to 
be reversed if the failure that occasioned the sanction was inadvertent, isolated, no worse 
than careless, or not a cause of serious inconvenience or prejudice."). 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained, in a similar context, that as long as a 
party conducts a "diligent search" for the requested documents and produces the best 
evidence it can find, its inability to produce the "missing" documents is not sanctionable. 
See Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Companies. Inc.. 62 F.3d 1469, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). In the present case, the bank records had been moved twice; their precise 
whereabouts were uncertain prior to the time Mr. Godfrey and others began searching for 
them. Ms. Schaugaard, however, was confident that the documents could be readily 
located. Employees of The Beehive House unsuccessfully searched for the documents at 
various times during June 1997. When Ms. Schaugaard returned from vacation on July 
10, all involved, including Mr. Godfrey, intensified the search for the bank records but 
were still unsuccessful. In light of these good-faith efforts to comply with plaintiffs 
requests, it was inappropriate to impose on Mr. Godfrey the extreme sanction of default 
judgment. 
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III. SEVERAL SERIOUS PROCEDURAL ERRORS DEMONSTRATE 
THAT DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
ENTERED AGAINST MR. GODFREY. 
The ultimate discovery sanction of default judgment should not be imposed unless 
the discovery requests were procedurally correct and, significantly, a prior order 
compelling discovery has been entered and subsequently breached. See Rule 37(b), Utah 
R. Civ. P. These prerequisites were lacking in this case, and it was an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to impose default judgment against Mr. Godfrey in their absence. 
First and foremost, the trial court's entry of default judgment against Mr. Godfrey 
as a discovery sanction was premised on the erroneous assumption that a prior order was 
in place compelling Mr. Godfrey to produce the Bank Records. The trial court incorrectly 
concluded that in conjunction with its Order on plaintiffs first Motion for Sanctions, it 
had issued a deadline for discovery responses with which Mr. Godfrey had not complied. 
At the hearing on plaintiffs second Motion for Sanctions, the trial court stated, "I set a 
deadline for discovery responses in the first order, but I haven't reviewed that particular 
order, but that's my practice ... Mr. Godfrey has done virtually nothing to attempt to 
comply with the Court's previous order." (R. at 548, at p. 33.) The trial court did not 
verify whether it had, in fact, issued such an order. Rather, the trial court, from the 
bench, proceeded on its incorrect assumption and authorized default judgment against Mr. 
Godfrey. 
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A review of the trial court's order on the first Motion for Sanctions, and of the 
transcript of the hearing on that motion, reveals that the trial court imposed no such 
deadline or order. (R. at 217-220; R. at 546, pp. 1-10.) To the contrary, the trial court 
ordered Mr. Godfrey to pay plaintiffs attorney fees and costs in bringing the motion, 
which he paid, and simply stated that the court would "permit the deposition to be 
rescheduled." (R. at 546, p. 7.) The most that can be said is that the trial court, by 
implication, ordered Mr. Godfrey to appear at the rescheduled deposition. Thus, contrary 
to the trial court's assumption, there was no court order in place compelling Mr. Godfrey 
to produce documents. 
That no such order was in place is significant: Rule 37(b) sanctions may not be 
imposed unless, pursuant a preliminary discovery violation, a court order or direction is in 
place compelling such discovery and such order or direction is not followed. 
Two things are required as conditions precedent before the gears of the 
sanction machinery of Rule 37(b) may be engaged: (1) a court order or 
direction must be in effect, and (2) that order or direction must be violated. 
The absence of a prior order or direction compelling discovery precludes 
Rule 37(b) sanctions. 
Moore's Federal Practice 3D, § 37.42[1] (1998). See also Attorney General v. The Irish 
People. Inc.. 684 F.2d 928, 951 n. 129 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert denied. 459 U.S. 1172 
(1983) (holding that "[a] production order is generally needed to trigger Rule 37(b)."); 
Jamie S. Gorelick, Stephen Marzen & Lawrence Solum, Destruction of Evidence §3.4 
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(1989 & Supp. 1995) ("[f]ederal court decisions ... unanimously agree that sanctions 
pursuant to Rule 37 may not be awarded absent violation of a court order."). 
The trial court's decision to enter default judgment against Mr. Godfrey was based 
on the erroneous conclusion that he had violated a prior discovery order. That alone 
provides an adequate basis for reversing the default judgment entered against Mr. 
Godfrey. 
In addition, the trial court relied heavily on Mr. Godfrey's alleged noncompliance 
with the original Notice of Deposition in August of 1996. The facts indicate, however, 
that plaintiffs counsel himself canceled that deposition date beforehand. In fact, counsel 
for both parties were in the process of resolving the discovery issues, and had agreed to 
depose Mr. Godfrey on September 20, 1996, when plaintiff unexpectedly filed her first 
Motion for Sanctions. 
The trial court's ruling also incorrectly assumes that the deposition scheduled for 
August 19, 1996 was properly noticed and that Mr. Godfrey failed to comply with a 
proper discovery request at that time. The notice served upon Mr Godfrey's attorney was 
styled "Notice of Deposition," and was dated August 7, 1996. In the notice, plaintiff 
requested Mr. Godfrey to produce certain documents at the deposition, which plaintiff 
scheduled for less than two weeks later, on August 19, 1996. The request was apparently 
pursuant to Rule 30(b)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which expressly requires 
compliance with the procedures outlined in Rule 34 (governing requests for production of 
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documents), namely, that the party upon whom the request is served must be given thirty 
(30) days to file a written response. Plaintiffs "Notice of Deposition" was thus deficient 
on its face; it did not allow the requisite thirty days to respond. As a result, Mr. Godfrey 
had no obligation to appear or produce any documents on August 19, 1996, and he had no 
obligation thereafter to produce any documents, as the trial court incorrectly assumed. 
In short, the trial court's decision to enter default judgment against Mr. Godfrey 
was premised on erroneous conclusions of law, misconceived evidence, and incorrect 
recollection of the record of the case. It was therefore an abuse of discretion to enter 
default judgment as a discovery sanction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant S. Chad Godfrey respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse and vacate the trial court's November 18, 1997 Default Order (Order on 
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Make Discovery), as to him, and vacate the 
entry of default judgment against him. 
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695 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 30 
rogatories. The depositions may then be taken in accordance 
with these rules; and the court may make orders of the 
character provided for by Rules 34 and 35. For the purpose of 
applying these rules to depositions for perpetuating testimony, 
each reference therein to the court in which the action is 
pending shall be deemed to refer to the court in which the 
petition for such deposition was filed. 
(4) Use of deposition. If a deposition to perpetuate testi-
mony is taken under these rules or if, although not so taken, 
it would be admissible in evidence in the courts of the state in 
which it is taken, it may be used in any action involving the 
same subject matter subsequently brought in any court of this 
state, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 26(d) [Rule 
32(a)!.' 
(b) Pending appeal. If an appeal has been taken from a 
judgment of a district court or before the taking of an appeal 
if the time therefor has not expired, the district court in which 
the judgment was rendered may allow the taking of the 
depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for use 
in the event of further proceedings in such court. In such case 
the party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make 
a motion in the district court for leave to take the depositions, 
upon the same notice and service thereof as if the action was 
pending in the district court. The motion shall show (1) the 
names and addresses of persons to be examined and the 
substance of the testimony which he expects to elicit from 
each; (2) the reasons for perpetuating their testimony. If the 
court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to 
avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may make an order 
allowing the depositions to be taken and may make orders of 
the character provided for by Rules 34 and 35, and thereupon 
the depositions may be taken and used in the same manner 
and under the same conditions as are prescribed in these rules 
for depositions taken in actions pending in the district court. 
(c) Perpetuation by action. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an action to perpetuate testi-
mony. 
Rule 28. Persons before whom depos i t ions may be 
taken. 
(a) Within the United States. Within the United States or 
within a territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, depositions shall be taken before an 
officer authorized to administer oaths by the laws of the 
United States or of the place where the examination is held, or 
before a person appointed by the court in which the action is 
pending. A person so appointed has power to administer oaths 
and take testimony. The term "officer" as used in Rules 30, 31, 
and 32 includes a person appointed by the court or designated 
by the parties under Rule 29. 
(b) In foreign countries. In a foreign country, depositions 
may be taken (1) on notice before a person authorized to 
administer oaths in the place in which the examination is 
held, either by the law thereof or by the law of the United 
States, or (2) before a person commissioned by the court, and 
a person so commissioned shall have the power by virtue of his 
commission to administer any necessary oath and take testi-
mony, or (3) pursuant to a letter rogatory. A commission or a 
letter rogatory shall be issued on application and notice and on 
terms that are just and appropriate. It is not requisite to the 
issuance of a commission or a letter rogatory that the taking of 
the deposition in any other manner is impracticable or incon-
venient; and both a commission and a letter rogatory may be 
issued in proper cases. A notice or commission may designate 
the person before whom the deposition is to be taken either by 
name or descriptive title. A letter rogatory may be addressed 
"To the Appropriate Authority in [here name of country]." 
Evidence obtained in response to a letter rogatory need not be 
excluded merely for the reason that it is not a verbatim 
transcript or that the testimony was not taken under oath or 
for any similar departure from the requirements for deposi-
tions taken within the United States under these rules. 
(c) Disqualification for interest. No deposition shall be 
taken before a person who is a relative or employee or attorney 
or counsel of any of the parties, or is a relative or employee of 
such attorney or counsel, or is financially interested in the 
action. 
Rule 29. Stipulations regarding discovery procedure. 
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by 
written stipulation 
(1) provide that depositions may be taken before any per-
son, at any time or place, upon any notice, and in any manner 
and when so taken may be used like other depositions, and 
(2) modify the procedures provided by these rules for other 
methods of discovery. 
Rule 30. Deposit ions upon oral examination. 
(a) When depositions may be taken. After commencement of 
the action, any party may take the testimony of any person, 
including a party, by deposition upon oral examination. Leave 
of court, granted with or without notice, must be obtained only 
if the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition prior to the expiration 
of 30 days after service of the summons and complaint upon 
any defendant or service made under Rule 4(e), except that 
leave is not required (1) if a defendant has served a notice of 
taking deposition or otherwise sought discovery, or (2) if 
special notice is given as provided in Subdivision (b)(2) of this 
rule. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by sub-
poena as provided in Rule 45. The deposition of a person 
confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such 
terms as the court prescribes. 
(b) Notice of examination; general requirements; special 
notice; non-stenographic recording; production of documents 
and things; deposition of organization; deposition by telephone. 
( D A party desiring to take the deposition of any person 
upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing 
to every other party to the action. The notice shall state the 
time and place for taking the deposition and the name and 
address of each person to be examined, if known, and, if the 
name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify 
him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. If a 
subpoena duces tecum is to be served on the person to be 
examined, the designation of the materials to be produced as 
set forth in the subpoena shall be attached to or included in 
the notice. 
(2) Leave of court is not required for the taking of a 
deposition by plaintiff if the notice (A) states that the person to 
be examined is about to go out of the district where the action 
is pending and more than 100 miles from the place of trial, or 
is about to go out of the United States, or is bound on a voyage 
to sea, and will be unavailable for examination unless his 
deposition is taken before expiration of the 30-day period, and 
(B) sets forth facts to support the statement. The plaintiff's 
attorney shall sign the notice, and his signature constitutes a 
certification by him that to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief the statement and supporting facts are 
true. The sanctions provided by Rule 11 are applicable to the 
certification. 
If a party shows that when he was served with notice under 
this Subdivision (b)(2) he was unable through the exercise of 
diligence to obtain counsel to represent him at the taking of 
the deposition, the deposition may not be used against him. 
(3) The court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the 
time for taking the deposition. 
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(4) The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may 
upon motion order that the testimony at a deposition be 
recorded by other than stenographic means. The stipulation or 
order shall designate the person before whom the deposition 
shall be taken and the manner of recording, preserving, and 
filing the deposition and may include other provisions to 
assure that the recorded testimony will be accurate and 
trustworthy. A party may arrange to have a stenographic 
transcription made at his own expense. Any objections under 
Subdivision (c), any changes made by the witness, his signa-
ture identifying the deposition as his own or the statement of 
the officer that is required if the witness does not sign, as 
provided in Subdivision (e), and the certification of the officer 
required by Subdivision (f) shall be set forth in a writing to 
accompany a deposition recorded by nonstenographic means. 
(5) The notice to a party deponent may be accompanied by 
a request made in compliance with Rule 34 for the production 
of documents and tangible things at the taking of the deposi-
tion. The procedure of Rule 34 shall apply to the request. 
(6) A party may in his notice and in a subpoena name as the 
deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an 
association, or a governmental agency and describe with 
reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is 
requested. In that event, the organization so named shall 
designate one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or 
other persons who consent to testify on its behalf and may set 
forth, for each person designated, the matters on which he will 
testify. A subpoena shall advise a nonparty organization of its 
duty to make such a designation. The persons so designated 
shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to 
the organization. This Subdivision (b)(6) does not preclude 
taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in these 
rules. 
(7) The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may 
upon motion order that a deposition be taken by telephone. 
For the purposes of this rule and Rules 28(a), 37(b)(1), and 
45(d), a deposition taken by telephone is taken at the place 
where the deponent is to answer questions propounded to him. 
(c) Examination and cross-examination; record of examina-
tion; oath; objections. Examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial under the 
provisions of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The officer before 
whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the witnesses on 
oath and shall personally or by someone acting under his 
direction and in his presence record the testimony of the 
witness. The testimony shall be taken stenographically or 
recorded by any other means ordered in accordance with 
Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule. If requested by one of the 
parties, the testimony shall be transcribed. All objections 
made at the time of the examination to the qualifications of 
the officer taking the deposition, to the manner of taking it, to 
the evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party and any 
other objection to the proceedings shall be noted by the officer 
upon the deposition. Evidence objected to shall be taken 
subject to the objections. In lieu of participating in the oral 
examination, parties may serve written questions in a sealed 
envelope on the party taking the deposition, and he shall 
transmit them to the officer, who shall propound them to the 
witness and record the answers verbatim. 
(d) Motion to terminate or limit examination. At any time 
during the taking of the deposition, on motion of a party or of 
the deponent and upon a showing that the examination is 
being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreason-
ably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, 
the court in which the action is pending or the court in the 
district where the deposition is being taken may order the 
officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from 
taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of 
the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c). If the 
order made terminates the examination, it shall be resume* 
thereafter only upon the order of the court in which the action 
is pending. Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent 
the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the time-
necessary to make a motion for an order. The provisions of 
Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred m 
relation to the motion. . ^ 
(e) Submission to witness; changes; signing. When the tea? 
timony is fully transcribed the deposition shall be submitted 
to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by himj 
unless such examination and reading are waived by the 
• witness and by the parties. Any changes in form or substance 
which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the 
deposition by the officer with a statement of the reasons given' 
by the witness for making them. The deposition shall then be 
signed by the witness, unless the parties by stipulation waive 
the signing or the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses' 
to sign. If the deposition is not signed by the witness within 30, 
days of its submission to him, the officer shall sign it and state 
on the record the fact of the waiver or of the illness or absence' 
of the witness or the fact of the refusal to sign together with 
the reason, if any, given therefore; and the deposition may 
then be used as fully as though signed unless on a motion to 
suppress under Rule 32(c)(4) the court holds that the reasons 
given for the refusal to sign require rejection of the deposition 
in whole or in part. •; 
(D Record of deposition; certification and delivery by officer; 
exhibits; copies. . 7: 
(1) The transcript or other recording of the deposition made 
in accordance with this rule shall be the record of the deposi-
tion. The officer shall sign a certificate, to accompany the 
record of the deposition, that it was duly sworn and that it is 
a true record of the testimony given by the witness. Unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, the officer shall securely seal 
the record of the deposition in an envelope endorsed with the 
title of the action and marked "Deposition of [here insert name 
of witness]" and shall promptly send the sealed record of the 
deposition to the attorney who arranged for the transcript or 
other record to be made. If any party in the action is not 
represented by an attorney, the record of the deposition shall 
be sent to the clerk of the court for filing unless otherwise 
ordered by the court. An attorney receiving the record of the 
deposition shall store it under conditions that will protect it 
against loss, destruction, tampering, or deterioration. 
(2) Documents and things produced for inspection during 
the examination of the witness shall, upon the request of a 
party, be marked for identification and annexed to the record 
of the deposition and may be inspected and copied by any 
party, except that if the person producing the materials 
desires to retain them that person may (A) offer copies to be 
marked for identification and annexed to the record of the 
deposition and to serve thereafter as originals, if the person 
affords to all parties fair opportunity to verify the copies by 
comparison with the originals, or (B) offer the originals to be 
marked for identification, after giving to each party an oppor-
tunity to inspect and copy them, in which event the originals 
may be used in the same manner as if annexed to the record of 
the deposition. Any party may move for an order that the 
originals be annexed to and returned with the record of the 
deposition to the court, pending final disposition of the case. 
(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed by the 
parties, the officer shall retain stenographic notes of any 
depositions taken stenographically or a copy of the recording 
of any deposition taken by another method. Upon payment of 
reasonable charges therefor, the officer shall furnish a copy of 
the record of the deposition to any party or to the deponent. 
(g) Failure to attend or to serve subpoena; expenses. 
(1) If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition 
fails to attend and proceed therewith and another party 
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(4) As to completion and return of deposition. Errors and 
irregularities in the manner in which the testimony is tran-
scribed or the deposition is prepared, signed, certified, sealed, 
endorsed, transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with by the 
officer under Rules 30 and 31 are waived unless a motion to 
suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made with 
reasonable promptness after such defect is, or with due 
diligence might have been, ascertained. 
(d) Publication of deposition. Use of a deposition under 
Subsection (a) of this rule shall have the effect of publishing 
the deposition unless the court orders otherwise in response to 
objections. 
Rule 33. Interrogatories to parties. 
(a) Availability; procedures for use. Any party may serve 
upon any other party written interrogatories to be answered 
by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private 
corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental 
agency, by any officer or agent, who shall furnish such infor-
mation as is available to the party. Interrogatories may, 
without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after 
commencement of the action and upon any other party with or 
after service of the summons and complaint upon that party. 
Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully 
in writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event 
the reasons for objection shall be stated in lieu of an answer. 
The answers are to be signed by the person making them, and 
the objections signed by the attorney making them. The party 
upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a 
copy of the answers and objections, if any, within 30 days after 
the service of the interrogatories, except that a defendant may 
serve answers or objections within 45 days after service of the 
summons and complaint upon that defendant. The court may 
allow a shorter or longer time. The party submitting the 
interrogatories may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with 
respect to any objection to or other failure to answer an 
interrogatory. 
(b) Scope; use at trial. Interrogatories may relate to any 
matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the 
answers may be used to the extent permitted by the Rules of 
Evidence. 
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objec-
tionable merely because an answer to the interrogatory in-
volves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the 
application of law to fact, but the court may order that such an 
interrogatory need not be answered until after designated 
discovery has been completed or until a pretrial conference or 
other later time. 
(c) Option to produce business records. Where the answer to 
an interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the 
business records of the party upon whom the interrogatory 
has been served or from an examination, audit, or inspection 
of such business records, including a compilation, abstract, or 
summary thereof and the burden of deriving or ascertaining 
the answer is substantially the same for the party serving the 
interrogatory as for the party served, it is a sufficient answer 
to such interrogatory to specify the records from which the 
answer may be derived or ascertained and to afford to the 
party serving the interrogatory reasonable opportunity to 
examine, audit, or inspect such records and to make copies, 
compilations, abstracts, or summaries. A specification shall be 
in sufficient detail to permit the interrogating party to locate 
and to identify, as readily as can the party served, the records 
from which the answer may be ascertained. 
Rule 34. Production of documents and things and entry 
upon land for inspection and other purposes. 
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request 
(1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or 
someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy, any desig--
nated documents (including writings, drawings, graphs, 
charts, photographs, phono-records, and other data compila-
tions from which information can be obtained, translated, if 
necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into 
reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample 
any tangible things • which constitute or contain matters 
within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the possession, 
custody or control of the party upon whom the request is 
served; or 
(2) to permit entry upon designated land or other property 
in the possession or control of the party upon whom the 
request is served for the purpose of inspection and measuring, 
surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property or 
any designated object or operation thereon, within the scope of 
Rule 26(b). 
(b) Procedure. The request may, without leave of court, be 
served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action 
and upon any other party with or after service of the summons 
and complaint upon that party. The request shall set forth the* 
items to be inspected either by individual item or by category, 
and describe each item and category with reasonable partic-
ularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and 
manner of making the inspection and performing the related 
acts. 
The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a 
written response within 30 days after the service of the 
request, except that a defendant may serve a response within 
45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon that 
defendant. The court may allow a shorter or longer time. The 
response shall state, with respect to each item or category, 
that inspection and related activities will be permitted as 
requested, unless the request is objected to, in which event the 
reasons for objection shall be stated. If objection is made to 
part of an item or category, the part shall be specified. The 
party submitting the request may move for an order under 
Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or other failure to 
respond to the request or any part thereof, or any failure to 
permit inspection as requested. 
(c) Persons not parties. This rule does not preclude an 
independent action against a person not a party for production 
of documents and things and permission to enter upon land. 
Rule 35. Phys ica l and mental examina t ion of persons. 
(a) Order for examination. When the mental or physical 
condition (including the blood group) of a party or of a person 
in the custody or under the legal control of a party is in 
controversy, the court in which the action is pending may 
order the party or person to submit to a physical or mental 
examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner or to 
produce for examination the person in the party's custody or 
legal control. The order may be made only on motion for good 
cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and 
to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, 
conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or 
persons by whom it is to be made. 
(b) Report of examining physician. 
(1) If requested by a party against whom an order is made 
under Rule 35(a) or the person examined, the party causing 
the examination to be made shall deliver to the person 
examined and/or the other party a copy of a detailed written 
report of the examiner setting out the examiner's findings, 
including results of all tests made, diagnosis and conclusions, 
together with like reports of all earlier examinations of the 
same condition. After delivery the party causing the examina-
tion shall be entitled upon request to receive from the party 
against whom the order is made a like report of any exami-
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nation, previously or thereafter made, of the same condition, 
unless, in the case of a report of examination of a person not a 
party, the party shows that the report cannot be obtained. The 
court on motion may order delivery of a report on such terms 
as are just, and if an examiner fails or refuses to make a report 
the court may exclude the examiner's testimony if offered at 
the trial. 
(2) By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination 
so ordered or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the 
party examined waives any privilege the party may have in 
that action or any other involving the same controversy, 
regarding the testimony of every other person who has exam-
ined or may thereafter examine the party in respect of the 
same mental or physical condition. 
(3) This subdivision applies to examinations made by 
agreement of the parties, unless the agreement expressly 
provides otherwise. This subdivision does not preclude discov-
ery of a report of any other examiner or the taking of a 
deposition of an examiner in accordance with the provisions of 
any other rule. 
(c) Right of party examined to other medical reports. At the 
time of making an order to submit to an examination under 
Subdivision (a) of this rule, the court shall, upon motion of the 
party to be examined, order the party seeking such examina-
tion to furnish to the party to be examined a report of any 
examination previously made or medical treatment previously 
given by any examiner employed directly or indirectly by the 
party seeking the order for a physical or mental examination, 
or at whose instance or request such medical examination or 
treatment has previously been conducted. If the party seeking 
the examination refuses to deliver such report, the court on 
motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on 
such terms as are just; and if an examiner fails or refuses to 
make such a report the court may exclude the examiner's 
testimony if offered at the trial, or may make such other order 
as is authorized under Rule 37. 
Rule 36. Reques t for admiss ion . 
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any 
other party a written request for the admission, for purpose of 
the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the 
scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to 
statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to 
fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in 
the request. The request for admission shall contain a notice 
advising the party to whom the request is made that, pursu-
ant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless 
said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the 
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may 
allow. Copies of documents shall be served with the request 
unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made 
available for inspection and copying. The request may, without 
leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commence-
ment of the action and upon any other party with or after 
service of the summons and complaint upon that party. 
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be 
separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within 
thirty days after service of the request, or within such shorter 
or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the 
request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the 
matter, signed by the party or by his attorney, but, unless the 
court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to 
serve answers or objections before the expiration of 45 days 
after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If 
objection is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The 
answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail 
the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit 
or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of 
the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a 
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of 
which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it 
as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering 
party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a 
reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has 
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or 
readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit 
or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an 
admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for 
trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he 
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or 
set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it. 
The party who has requested the admissions may move to 
determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless 
the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall 
order that an answer be served. If the court determines that 
an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, 
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an 
amended answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these 
orders, determine that final disposition of the request be made 
at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to trial. 
The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion. 
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this 
rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion 
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject 
to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial 
order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to 
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice 
him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. Any 
admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose 
of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for 
any other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other 
proceeding. 
Rule 37. Fa i lu re to m a k e or coopera te in discovery; 
sanc t ions . 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected 
thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as 
follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party 
may be made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on 
matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the district 
where the deposition is being taken. An application for an 
order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the 
court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question pro-
pounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or 
other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 
31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted 
under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for 
inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit 
inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for 
an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order 
compelling inspection in accordance with the request. When 
taking a deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the 
question may complete or adjourn the examination before he 
applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may 
make such protective order as it would have been empowered 
to make on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
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(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this 
subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as 
a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, 
the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the 
party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or 
the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to 
pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in 
obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court 
finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of ex-
penses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the" court shall, after opportunity for 
hearing, require the moving party or the attorney advising the 
motion or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who 
opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in 
opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court 
finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified 
or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court 
may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to 
the motion among the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. 
If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after 
being directed to do so by the court in the district in which the 
deposition is being taken, the failure may be considered a 
contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party 
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person 
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of 
a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, 
including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or 
Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 
26(f), the court in which the action is pending may make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others 
the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order 
was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be 
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with 
the claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to 
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibit-
ing him from introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying 
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the 
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a 
judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition 
thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to 
obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or 
mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under 
Rule 35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, 
such orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this 
subdivision, unless the party failing to comply shows that he is 
unable to produce such person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, 
the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or 
the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable 
expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, 
unless the court finds that the failure was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of ex-
penses unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the 
genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as 
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the 
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document 
or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an 
order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable, 
expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable 
attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds 
that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 
36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial 
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable 
ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) 
there was other good reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve 
answers to interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. 
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party 
or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify 
on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is 
to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, 
or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submit-, 
ted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, 
or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection 
submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, 
the court in which the action is pending on motion may make, 
such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among 
others it may take any action authorized under Paragraphs 
(A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any 
order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party 
failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the 
failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be 
excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objection-
able unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective 
order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan.. 
If a party or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the 
framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required by 
Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, 
require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the 
failure. 
PART VI. TRIALS 
Rule 38. J u r y t r ia l of r igh t . 
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by 
the constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved to 
the parties. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any 
issue triable of right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee 
and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in 
writing at any time after the commencement of the action and 
not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading 
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a 
pleading of the party. 
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a party may 
specify the issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall 
be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so 
triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only some of the 
issues, any other party, within 10 days after service of the 
demand or such lesser time as the court may order, may serve 
a demand for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of 
fact in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to 
serve a demand as required by this rule and to file it as 
required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by 
jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may 
not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties. 
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Ronny L. Cutshall (USB #0793) 
Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY M. TUCK, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, a Utah Limited 
Partnership, and S. CHAD GODFREY, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION 
Case No. 950908242CN 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
1S0107 1 
TO THE DEFENDANTS, S. CHAD GODFREY AND THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, AND 
THEIR COUNSEL: 
Notice is hereby given that the deposition of S. Chad Godfrey in the above-entitled 
action will be taken before a certified shorthand reporter at the offices of Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough, 1500 First Interstate Plaza, 170 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on Monday, August 19, 1996 commencing at 10:00 a.m. 
Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(5) and 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant 
Godfrey is requested to bring with him the following documents to his deposition: 
1. All bank statements or other records of deposit indicating what disposition 
The Beehhe House or S. Chad Godfrey made of funds paid by plaintiff Mary M. Tuck 
through tender of the checks attached to the complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11. 
2- Any and all cancelled checks, check registers, ledgers, accounting records, 
or other documents of any nature or description reflecting the disposition which S. Chad 
Godfrey or The Beehive House made of any of the funds transferred by means of the checks 
attached to plaintiffs complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11. 
3. Any and all contracts, letters of intent, memoranda of understanding or 
other written agreements (or written memoranda of verbal agreements) between plaintiff and 
The Beehive House and/or S. Chad Godfrey. 
4. Any copies of the Policies and Procedures of The Beehive House bearing 
plaintiffs signature. 
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5. Copies of any and all notices to pay or quit, notices of delinquency, or 
other written communication whether between S. Chad Godfrey and/or The Beehive House, 
and plaintiff, in connection with plaintiffs alleged failure to pay rent as set out at paragraph 
6 of your counterclaim herein. 
6. Copies of any billings, accountings, or itemizations, or other documents of 
whatever nature setting out the services and tasks performed on plaintiffs behalf by S. Chad 
Godfrey and/or The Beehive House, as set out at paragraph 9 of the counterclaim. 
DATED this V^ day of August, 1996. 







180107 1 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _J day of August, 1996, I caused to be hand 
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF DEPOSITION, to the 
following: 
Brad W. Merrill 
PARRY, MURRAY & WARD 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple / 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 // 
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'^District 
Ronny L. Cutshall (USB #0793) 
Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & Md)ON( >UGII 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 j 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 V 
pzM 199; 
iAL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY M. TUCK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, a Utah Limited 
Partnership, and S. CHAD GODFREY, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
^ V - ^ - ^ 7 - if; 0 \ CAS>^ 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO 
ATTEND DEPOSITION AND 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Case No. 950908242CN 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Attend Deposition, and 
defendants' Motion for Protective Order, in the above-entitled matter came on for hearing 
before the Court on Friday, March 28, 1997, at 8:30 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by his 
counsel of record, Vincent C. Rampton of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. 
Defendant S. Chad Godrey was represented by his counsel of record, Kim R. Wilson of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau. Defendant Beehive House was represented by its counsel 
of record, David M. McGrath of Parry, Murray & Ward. 
The Court having reviewed the moving papers and submittals of the 
parties, having heard oral argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and 
good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions is granted to the extent 
hereinafter stated as to defendant S. Chad Godfrey only. 
2. Defendants' Motion for Protective Order is denied. 
3. Defendant S. Chad Godfrey is ordered to pay to plaintiff's 
counsel the sum of $ M ^ 5~. —^ , representing plaintiff's costs and attorneys' fees 
incurred in the filing and arguing of its Motion for Sanctions, and in defending against 
Defendants' Motion for Protective Order. Said sum shall be paid on or before May 1, 1997. 
4. In the event that sanctions are paid, in the amount and by the 
time specified above, the parties shall thereafter schedule the deposition of S. Chad Godfrey 
at a time and place agreeable to counsel. 
DATED this ^ l ^ d a y of April, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Third District Court Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
•JbL 
firad W. Merrill, Esq. 
Attorney for The Beehive House 
APPROVED AS 
Attorney forNS. Chad Godfrey 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the eg" day of April, 1997, I caused to be transmitted via 
telefax, and mailed via first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing form of ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE 
TO ATTEND DEPOSITION AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
to the following: 
Brad W. Merrill, Esq. 
PARRY, MURRAY & WARD 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Kim R. Wilson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place #1100 / 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 / ' 
/ 
/ 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
MARY M. TUCK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, a Utah Limited 
Partnership, and S. CHAD GODFREY, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION 
Case No. 950908242CN 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
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TO THE DEFENDANTS, S. CHAD GODFREY AND THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, AND 
THEIR COUNSEL: 
Notice is hereby given that the depositions of Ralph Godfrey and S. Chad Godfrey 
in the above-entitled action will be taken before a certified shorthand reporter at the offices 
of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 1500 First Interstate Plaza, 170 South Main, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on the dates and at the times indicated below: 
1. Ralph Godfrey - Thursday, July 10, 1997 at 10:00 a.m. 
2. S. Chad Godfrey - Friday, July 11, 1997 at 10:00 a.m. 
Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(5) and 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, deponents are 
requested to bring with them the following documents to their depositions, to the extent such 
documents are in their possession or under their control or otherwise accessible to them: 
1. All bank statements or other records of deposit indicating what disposition 
The Beehive House or S. Chad Godfrey made of funds p/.id by plaintiff Mary M. Tuck 
through tender of the checks attached to the complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11. 
2. Any and all cancelled checks, check registers, ledgers, accounting records, 
or other documents of any nature or description reflecting the disposition which S. Chad 
Godfrey or The Beehive House made of any of the funds transferred by means of the checks 
attached to plaintiffs complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11. 
218100 1 
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3. Any and all contracts, letters of intent, .xiemoranda of understanding or 
other written agreements (or written memoranda of verbal agreements) between plaintiff and 
The Beehive House and/or S. Chad Godfrey. 
4. Any copies of the Policies and Procedures of The Beehive House bearing 
plaintiffs signature. 
5. Copies of any and all notices to pay or quit, notices of delinquency, or 
other written communication whether between S. Chad Godfrey and/or The Beehive House, 
and plaintiff, in connection with plaintiffs alleged failure to pay rent as set out at paragraph 
6 of your counterclaim herein. 
6. Copies of any billings, accountings, or itemizations, or other documents of 
whatever nature setting out the services and tasks performed on plaintiffs behalf by S. Chad 
Godfrey and/or The Beehive House, as set out at paragraph 9 of the counterclaim. 
DATED this 1 ^ day of June, 1997. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 7 " 
Via^St C. Rampton 
218100.1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the JJ* day of June, 1997, I caused to be hand 
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF DEPOSITION, to the 
following: 
Brad W. Merrill 
PARRY, MURRAY & WARD 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Kim R. Wilson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place #1100 







Ronny L. Cutshall (USB #0793) 
Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & M 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Third Judicial District 
NOV 18,1997 
WLJ*KEdc4«ir, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY M TUCK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE BEEHIVE HOUSE, a Utah Limited 




ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO 
MAKE DISCOVERY 
Case No. 950908242CN 
Jud^e Anne M. Stirba 
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Make Discovery in the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the Court on Thursday, September 4, 1997 at 9:00 a.m. 
Plaintiff was represented by his counsel of record, Vincent L. Rampton of Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough. Defendant S. Chad Godfrey was represented by his counsel of 
record, David L. Pinkston of Snow, Christensen & Martineau Defendant Beehive House 
was represented by its counsel of record, Brad W. Merrill of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Green & 
MacRae 
The Court reviewed the moving papers and submittals of the parties, heard oral 
argument of counsel, and stated a bench ruling granting plaintiffs motion as set out herein. 
Plaintiffs counsel submitted a form of order accompanied by an affidavit of attorney's fees, 
to which defendant Beehive House registered an objection, resulting in a hearing held on 
November 14, 1997. The court having heard argument on the objection filed by defendant 
Beehive House, having reviewed the affidavit of plaintiffs counsel, being fully advised in the 
premises, finding hereby that final judgment as set out herein may and should be entered, 
there being no just cause for delay, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions is granted as to defendant S. Chad Godfrey. 
2. The pleadings of S. Chad Godfrey herein are stricken, and judgment by 
default is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff Estate of Mary Tuck, and against defendant S. 
Chad Godfrey, as prayed in plaintiffs complaint, as follows: 
a. $381,700.00, representing the principal amount of plaintiffs claim 
herein; 
b. $109,322.30, representing prejudgment interest on plaintiffs' principal 
claim at the legal rate of ten percent (10%) per annum accrued through September 15, 1997; 
c. $170.00, representing plaintiffs costs herein; and 
d. Interest on the foregoing at the postjudgment rate from September 15, 
1997 until paid in full. 
The foregoing order shall constitute entry of a final judgment under Rule 54, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, there being no just cause for delay. 
3. Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions against defendant Beehive House is granted in 
part and taken under advisement in part, as follows: 
239832 1 2 
a. Defendant Beehive House shall pay to plaintiff, on or before the fifth 
(5th) day following entry of this Order , ft le si n n of $1 ,600.00, representing plaintiff's . 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred in pursuing this Motion for Sanctions; 
b. On or before September defendant Beehive House shall 
produce the following documents to plaintiffs counsel: 
(1) All bank statements or other records of deposit indicating what 
disposition The Beehive House or S. Chad Godfrey made of funds paid by plaintiff Mary M. 
Tuck through tender of the checks attached to the complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11; 
and 
(2) Any and all cancelled checks, check registers, ledgers, 
accounting records, cr other documents of any nature or description reflecting the disposition 
which S. Chad Godfrey or The Beehive House made of any of the funds transferred by 
means of the checks attached to plaintiffs complaint herein as exhibits 1-8 and 10-11. 
In the event the Beehive House is unable to locate and produce said documents, defendant the 
Beehive House shall, on or before September 15, 1997, produce reasonable evidence that it 
can obtain copies of said documents from its bank or other sources. 
4 In the event defendant Beehive House does not make payment as prescribed 
herein, and/or fails to produce documents as set out above, the Court will entertain a renewal 
239832.1 3 
of plaintiff's motion to strike the pleadings of defendant Beehive House and enter judgment 
against it as prayed in plaintiff's complaint herein. 
DATED this ( f t^day of November, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Third District Court Judge 
239832 1 4 
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^ tl 3. n —. 1 7" 1 t e G 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
Vincent Hampton 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROQK u KcDONi 
170 South Xain, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
For the Beehive House: 
3rad W. Merrill 
13c South Main Street, Suite 1 
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L a v i d L . P i n k s t o n 





P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is the matcer c: 
versus Beehive House, Case No. S50908242. T: 
the time set for argument on the motion for 
sanctions. 
Counsel, would you state your sti 
e s : a : e o r .-:arv 







. n K v o u 
- ir v_ O - l 
• c a r r e y 




 1 1 v - r ^ 
Counsel. I have read all of the pleadings. I am 
familiar with the case because this is not the 
first time they sent a motion for sanctions. And 
feel well informed of the background and factual 
background involved here. And 1 will tell you th; 
I think that there is no auestion that there -- i: 
Pace 4 
my mind, at this point, that sanctions are 
appropriate. The question is, what sanctions? 
And before I'd ordered attorney's f * 
and costs to be paid, and that approximately is 
$1,000, and so the question in my mind is: vrhat 
the appropriate sanction here? Because clearly 
jn the facts that have been presented in 
there has been failure to - - v: e 11 , to 
K = Q p. ; 
i n v: n i 






p 1 e a d i : 
t n t i o n 
itself, then you can feel free to do so, or if you 
think that something has been overlooked as you've 
heard my comments here this morning. 
understanding, you may proceed. Mr. 
P a g e 
- 1 
Aucrus t 2 9 t h 
p> v" *~\ o •": *"; 
MR. HAMPTON: Your Honor, as a 
r.atter, v; e received on the evening 
an affidavit of S. Chad Godfrey. 7 
dered that ail submittals in this 
place by July 29th. Ke believe it 
d ask that it be stricken. 
Z'r.E CCURT : Whi ch matte r was r e ce i v 
.A:-:?TON: 
— ^ c 
e x p l a i n e d 
t c n i m in t v.* o c. i z z e r e n t c i t i e s in z. u r c c e , o n e in 
2 0! France and one in Italy. Kr. Godfrey was unable 
2 1; find anyone in Italy who was willing to notarize 
2 21 the a f f i d a v i t . 
2 3| Apparently it's kind of a lengthy 
24 bureaucratic process to get something notarized i: 
j 




our.5 e 1 . 
' v- r*> v~\ /-> V~\ V-V ., V_/ » W « ^ > 
. returnea to us. 
•pon his return to the country, we : 
[ notarized and filed and delivered 
realize that you or the Court v;as 
on being opposed - - that the deadl: 
the motion was the 2 S t h of - - excui 
: e 27th or 2Sth of July. Cur ~otic: 
. ~ v; a s 1 o - r 
. - L. - C ^ 
c x I l U b - : . ^ i ; c; rJ . 
A : 
O - V - X w ^ , I ^ 
2 G! o r d e a l . 
THE COURT: I wouldn't know but I'll 
2 2| certainly take your representation. I think u n d• 
2 31 the circumstances, I'll not grant the notion to 
strike. Where there's no prejudice, I 
to -- for this to be unduly technical. 
L \^> J, - W 
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memoranda were to be submitted, that conflicts, of 
course, any affidavit that was before. Given the 
practical problems here, I WT i 11 consider the 
affidavit. (Inaudible) to the plaintiff. 
MR. RAM F T ON: Thanks, Your Honor. 
Based on the Court's opening observations in this 
matter, I'm going to address myself in the time we 
have directly to the nature of sanctions w h i c h are 
appropriate in this matter. 
First of all, a couple of facts that 
r e a since our -r r^  ' — ~ : - i i c i — .; 
a z z i a a v o: 
i s a u u a : 
;N : 
K e e o e r v- .3 "-• r> • 
• ^ k ^ ^ : 
e , e s t a o i i s n m g scrr Q T.* »~ -i r* ' 
\-, — — ^ _ 
The Court is reminded that we asked for 
the bank records which are now the subject of this 
motion, first in August of 1996. We've been trying 
to get them for over a year. 
At that time, according to Mrs. 
Skougard's affidavit, those records were being 
regularly kept, regularly compiled and regularly 
Page 6 
placed in a labeled box of which she had persona] 
custody and knew exactly where it was. v:hen y.i* . 
^ j .ailed to appear for his deposition 
r s t time, those had already been rr. a d e the 
subject of cur request for production and Beehiv-









L- w - - v C i i . 
t n e s u o j e c z or written aisccvery requests r o r ever 
a year and was identifiable and known as to its 
location and contents at the time the request was 
first made has now suddenly vanished now that X r. 
Godfrey is back. 
All 1 can say is that's a convenient 
Page 9 
51 
situation but I don't know the actual 
circumstances. However, the actual circumstances 
don't change the plight that I'm nov; in. This casi 
has from the beginning been about what happened to 
this m c n e y . W e k n ow they got it, w e know they got 
the checks that were labeled leans or investments, 
we knov; that they didn't pay it back. What 
v" f\ *n *~ r^- • 
taken, d i v 
.a t ' s unf or t' 
. sn' t it 
1 s c c v e r 
. £3 kJ-^XZll 
L o v; ana 
19 I really don't -- by the nature of the s i t u a t i c 
20| have no facts to do that. But the fact remain: 
2 1 that I'm nov; without the documents that I need 
22 Now, proposing --
23 THE COURT: Are those documents as 
24 of your position? 
2 5j MR. RAMPTON: Pardon? 
D a Page 10 
THE COURT: Do you have your documents 
as part cf your position? 
KR. RAKPTON: Concerning -- well, no, 
that's not exactly true. Concerning the 
disposition of funds, I have no documents to 
establish that. I have no bank records, with the 
exception c f certain records which were delivered 
to my office at 4:30 yesterday' afternoon. C p p c s i n 
• L :. i -L :; 
e v i d e n c e en t n e race or t n e can.-; s t a t e m e n t s 
but the bank s t a t e m e n t s don't tell me w h e r e the 
m. o n e \* v«' e n t .o e o a u s e L. n e r e a r e n o c n e c ."; s i o o n t 
know what they did with it. 
I'm in the same position I was when we 
filed this action. Depending on what happened to 
that money, I may have causes of action I haven't 
even pled in this case yet. We're still 
filling cut the pleadings stage. And now i \ r ' v" ~ 
£! 
Page 11 
t e they've lost the records and so we' II 
.ever kncv: exactly what happened. And yet, the 
: e e h i v e House has taken the position that they have 
. o responsibility because Chad Godfrey put the 
i o n ' t l o o 
h a v e d o n e s o m e t h i n g w i : 
l o n ' t h a v e a d e q u a t e r e c o r d s , 
a s k i n g f o r f r o m t h e b e g i n n i 
r v e r e l y p r e j u d i c e d i n t h i s 
^ w * . ;_ 
s t a r t t= ** ^ c . 
IS {Inaudible)? 
20 MR. y.ERRILL: Your Honor, let me take 
2 1] issue with a couple of points made by Kr . Rarr.pton 
22J and I too will direct my comments based upon 
2 31 (Inaudible) indications prior to argument that the 
Court's inclined to make sanctions. 
If that's the Court's inclination, it'; 
Page 12 
our position that at a minimum default is not an 
appropriate, sanction for this particular discovery 
problem. And that at most, the (Inaudible) 
•p -; ~ 
.cial sanctions entered 
The first item that I dispute from Mr. 
Hampton is that there have been no disputes since 
the beginning of this litigation that the money 
that was paid to Chad Godfrey v:ent into these 
certain accounts. We've had documentation of that 
he cime the comolaint v:as filed. The cr.ezks z rcrr 
.c . 
• ^ Q ^ ^ i c z . . . b i_o J ^ ~ ^ -. t: c; -
U i i L O U v 
"I _ _ _ » « _ V-N 
c i s c c v e r v 
G o d f r e y a n d C h a G o a r r e y o n -. y . 
v; r. ae i . J. c a ^ c< 
she expected Chad to pay it back. 
There's also been affidavit testimony 
in the case that she's - - that Mary Tuck indicated 
to other people that she did not believe she lent 
any of that money to the Beehive House itself. And 
so at the beginning of this case, much of the 
discovery was focused upon Chad Godfrey. And I 
P a g e 13 
i e r s t a i i U U - * C :ourt's concern and Mr. Ramoten's 
time, and that's not disputed. 
One of the things that I would take 
issue with, however, is that I don't believe that 
61 some of the discovery problems are entirely the 
7j fault of defendants. In this case, it took quire 
8; while for an initial discovery action or request 
Ana tnat w: 
last, it was fecuse; 
— ^ — _ ex -L 
Q .=. rr <' -. ^ ' 
v; nere. 







r^ -^ *- f 
___ s tne aecision ne maae, ana _ was 
obligated to go with that. And I understood t 
the Court was displeased by that and did not 
appreciate Mr. Godfrey not disclosing his 
whereabouts. And as a result, a motion for 
sanctions was filed, an initial motion for 




s u r r c u i 
ccmoiete 
I believe that the circumstances 
ing the present motion for sanctions are 
ly different. Discovery requests were 
. e a :cr 
d ^ ^ ~ v n 
ci an err.c--
epositions for Chad Godfrey and for 
The first request for a deposition 
1/^ 0 of tz. h e Beehive House v/ a s the 
icr. request for Ralph Godfrey. At that 







- ^ i -; v l a u c i n c 
Locum; S I ^ C J 
c ^ ^' c: tneir Qsoosition as noticeo orecarec 
o testify. Plaintiff's counsel made the 
determination that it did not to want to orcceed 
~ V ~ V-. / -with the deposition because the documents v;er 
there. I'm not going to question his decision o: 
that regard. Documents were produced at that 
Page 15 
THE COURT: But not near -- (Inaudible) 
that could be considered full and complete. 
MR. MERRILL: And I certainly 
acknowledge that, Your Honor. But - - and the Rules 
of Civil Procedure are clear, that a party under 
Rule 34 is responsible to produce documents in its 
possession, custody and control. 
Nov;, I don't dispute that those 
at a time were in cos s e s s ion , ousted'/ and 
. ve - n :: c P 
.a L a c/ ^ ' . r s 
l o c a t e d v; h ere the y t h o u g h t the y v; e r e , v; e 
d o u b l e - c h e c k e d it, t r i p l e - c h e c k e d it. We s e r v e d a 
subpoena upon the bank to produce at least the b a n• 
statements because we knew we had those. 
Mr. Rampton contends that he can't 
prove his case because there's no documents 
available, we've taken them, and certainly implied 
that they've been intentionally taken, which I 
don't -- obviously, there's no evidence of that. 
Page 16 
Nov;, I - - I do not see the merit of 
that argument for a couple of reasons. First of 
all, the bank documents can be recovered. We've 
recovered the bank statements, we can determine 
which checks that Kr. Rampton would like to produce 
and either he can pursue a subpoena or we can to 
recover these checks. 
Obviously, if Mr. Godfrey or anybody 
else had desired to intentionally dispose of 
"_: IT p — 7 7 H T • JL "! "*• r i C '"^  "" ID O v O r I* ** ^ , */t* 
believe that a subpoena to the bank would not 
produce every b a nk i n g record that we - -
THE COURT: V7 e 11 w h v haver.' t: v c u zzr.a 
/< e a i a a o a s u o p o e n a to 
request the bank statements. We did not request 
cancelled checks because of the voluminous nature 
of that •• 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, I'll 
wait until you're done. 
MR. MERRILL: My feeling en that, Your 
Page 17 
Honor, was that once we got the bank statements, we 
could determine if there were specific checks that 
were relevant or at issue, that we could then 
request those specific checks. 
~KE COURT: (Inaudible) talking about 
this? This was already, as I recall, the subject 
irst Met ion to Comoel, was it not? 
tion to Comeel dec 
. o attend r.:s a e: 
> a r r e v G I G r.< 
V_ ... d U 
correc t'? 
i o v e e 
:ERR:LL 
^ -
 w -' t- Vi 
w ^ ^ C — ^ — W . i 
employee of 
THE COURT: At any time, was he the 
the Beehive House? Chad Godfrey. 
KR. KERRILL: During what time period? 
THE COURT: Any time period. 
MR. MERRILL: Yes, he has been an 
e m o i o v e e 
THE COURT: Okay. And at what t Ir-
an d if I understood Mr. Rampten correctly, he 
saying that the records were available at the 
Beehive House according to the Skougard, the 
bookkeeper at the Beehive House. 
MR. MERRILL: I believe that's cor 
our n o: 
- n — v^ <s u .v i All _ ^  - v- -
J ^ c b were mace r > 
r* ,"> *~* i 
V V 
•v- - r* • 
the documents v:as located at the Beehive Hcus: 
v: i:hin the p o w e r of the Beehive House to make 
available or photocopy --
MR. M E R RIL L: I don't know if 
that's --
THE COURT: -- or in response to a 
discovery request made in August of last year. 
Pace IS 
MR. MERRILL: I don't know if that's 
entirely correct for a couple of reasons. The 
first reason was the discovery request in August 
was for Chad Godfrey and Chad did not make an 
effort, at least that I'm aware of, because he d: 
not plan on attending his deposition. He electee 
to chose to not appear, although --
ZKZ COURT: Wasn't he incarcerated -
VR. MERRILL: He was incarcerated; 
„ „ I ^ ^ . _ , „ . , . , 
ibi i n z. L, u u xi : A 11 r i g n t . v, n e n w as t n e 
19 discovery request made on the Beehive House? 
20 MR. MERRILL: I believe there was an 
21 initial notice of deposition served for Ralph 
22 Godfrey in November - December of last year. And 
23 through discussions with counsel, it was determine; 
24 that that would be continued until after the motic: 
2 51 for sanctions had been decided, the original 
Pace 20 
notion, 
issued after the motion for sanctions was entered. 
THE COURT: But you're telling me that 
e ven zh ouch the Beehive House had t h e box of 
documents in August of 19 96 and the lawsuit was 
o e n d i n a, and the Beehive House was cart of it at 
w *i CX U erne n c w tr.at 
. tr c• 1 of the 
:x or 
Q O ? 
w
 i i n C c i l
 (
^ e : l cx^. — U 




2 2 | 
2 3 | 
2 41 
in e cis c o v e r y was rocusec t c 
He was unable to comply, elected not to 
as a result, although Ms. Skougard believed in he: 
affidavit that was filed for this motion, believed 
that the documents at that point were available, 
she looked at that ooin; 
Page 21 
. a L L b w : x a 
there's no way to know whether they were 
were. In fact, I think one of t 
he rr.akes aware in her affidavit i 
that the documents are all where 
would be and didn't think there' 
ocate then. And she made efforts 
bunch of people to lock for them 
u1d n' t find then. 
£> w - * a u 





zh o u g h t 
p r o b l e m 
s o , as>: 
. c -. 
- n z, ^ ~ ^ ^ 1 I rtii I . „ - , ^ ^ <_ 
_ . * _ * . V d l i O ^* w W — S^ d — - -
.e en 
° ~ - j 
19 i t i n J u l y ? 
20| y.R. XERRILL: Well, that's an 
21 - interesting question, Your Honor, and it probably 
2 2j has a number of answers. Based upon the affidavits 
23 that have been filed, they first began looking for 
i 
2 4 that box in mid-June. And from what we understand, 
bK c u g a r a air e c t e a some c i..u . o y c c : .c co ce: 
Page 22 
6| 
places where she thought the box could be looked 
for. They reported to her they didn't see it 
there, they weren't able to find it. She says, 
Well, it's got to be there. 
And eventually, in the beginning of 
July, after she had been gone on vacation and so: 
other oersor.al leave, she went and looked, she 
G u n n c wr.oie cerica c: 
c ec c _e were miss ne 
v_ .. tr a i to your zu e szic n 








una i i j- t n e o a" 
^ c c >: m c 
cox 
10th and 11th. 
. o see ii tney 
THE COURT: All right, 
.nswer filed? And is there a counterclaim? 
MR. MERRILL: There is. 
THE COURT: All right. When was you: 
.nswer and counterclaim filed? 




! a r c n or 9 6. 
THE COURT: ± u^  
lay 13 of '96 and that answer and counterclaim was 
ilea 
y.R . y.ERRI LL : That nay be correct, Your 
r. o n o r I don't have that file w i t h 
'hen was y.r . Gc v p u ' c; 
; :;KSTON T f- *- "U 
16! 








V T "Z 7? T T v n v v-
ny clients were L- ca. r*. JL i i a at that point was thai 
the money was loaned to Chad Godfrey, that he coul< 
do whatever he wanted with it. If he deposited it 
in the Beehive House account, it was his money to 
do that with. But it was loaned to hin, the 





they were leaned to him. And 




- where t'. 
w as c o m a 
a l l e a a z . 
d not believe, based upon tht 
' o r t h in the answer and 
kt the r;cney was ever inter.de: 
:use by Mary Tuck, and she r.e' 
: o n r e : 
1 S| MR. PINKSTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
2 01 In listening the Court's questioning of both Xr. 
Merrill and Mr. Rarr.pton, I sense the Court's 
22| concern that the request for documents has been i: 
23| place since August of '96 and the concern I sense 
from the Court is that why didn't somebody do 
Zz\ scmethino while the documents were still sittina 
Page 25 
tr.ere in tne c m c e . 
THE COURT: A concern, yes. 
MR. PINKSTON: Yes, it is one of the 
Court's concerns. And this would be cur --
THE COURT: Well, and we would also 
talk about following the order and granting the 
first Motion to Compel, although I understand it 
related to the deposition but it also had to do 
the product 
PIXKSTCN: 
c-i-i.^. — — _^ 
'i oc; 
MR. P I N K S T O N 
M r . M e r r i l l has r e p r e s e n t e d to the C o u r t , M r . 
Godfrey's rationale for so doing. 
When Mr. Godfrey returned in November 
of 'S6, I suppose we could say, well, why didn't 
you gather up the documents at that point and 
return them? The only explanation, Your Honor, is 
that upon his return to work, J. JLuLcH 
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c:r.< things that he wanted to take care of, m a k < 
c rat-r^l ployment was secure, ]us' 
en his feet and get things going. It r.ay simply be 
a case of out of sight out of mind, upon his return 
from prison back to normal life. 
The second recuest was issued in June 
of this year, as is set forth in the af: 
testimony, when the notice of depesitic: 
1 G a V 1 t 
i c v e e s or 
. o locate . c c o r 
.•. a v 
"^ r-\ O 
. ^ ^ e i < 3 ^ ^ ; i U i > 
were 
' *~> ^ V" ; 
it drive a w a v , s'r.-
;\ n a t s t e o s a i a 
-s e rec! • H ^ ? 
KR PIXKSTON: He instructed D e a n n e 
Skougard to look for the records as soon as he - -
THE COURT: Well, he was no longer an 
employee of Beehive, so he made a phone call, 
called her up and said, would you look for these 
documents, something to that effect? 
MR. FINKSTON: That's correct. I'm no' 
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sure whether it was a phone call or whether it was 
a face-tc-face discussion, but he asked Deanne 
Skougard to look for those records. 
As Ms. Skougard indicates she - -
THE COURT: And he did that when? 
MR. ?INKSTON: That would have been :h-
r.icdle cf June, upon receipt of the notice of 
Oka v 
i s s u e c c r a n 11 n c 
«- i ~. 
here. Let's see, March 28, '97, so that's when the 
oral argument was held, the first Motion to Compel, 
and the order on that was entered en April 2 0th. 
And so he waited until June to begin looking for 
the documents? 
MR. PINKSTON: Upon receipt of the 
notice of deposition. That's our understanding, 
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r o u r r .onor 
r e c o r a s a t i s s u e i n t i n s n o t i o n a r e t n e r e . V_y _ v^ . ^ O — 
Beehive House. At the time of the deposition in 
July of this year, Mr. Godfrey produced all of :he 
documents in his control, custody or possession 
: s D o n s i v e t: •w.:: w i c cuest tnat r e i a u e a to m m 
Godfrey produced those documents, was available to 
be sv:cm in and participated in his deposition. 
v.* a i t i n cr for the documents? 
11 o n 
recues' 
: a. ^ w' L- v_ , 
requiring him to pay attorney's fees and costs, 
which I understand he did, for failing to produce 
the discovery, and (Inaudible) deposition. Then he 
-- there's the order on that on April 20. He --
he - - out of sight out of mind, as has been stated 
before, doesn't do anything for two months, 
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approximately, until he receives a notice of 
deposition. Aithouqh he was under the obligation 
.o produce the discovery i? j . : . s~ c j» 
in the fall. But obviously, also, 
reintorcea ov V- n ^ y. of sanctions rir e -. *_ t: 1 ~ U 
rrom nis raiiure to ao so to tnat o o m t . ^nc tnen 
*-~ J -; 
1- In = t- ' 
ii ~ C <-». S u ' 
V- — — / 






the sanction of default, basically, the u 11 i ~ j 
drop-dead sanction in this case. We do net d: 
that the first motion for sanctions was 
appropriate, particularly since Mr. Godfrey d: 
disclose his whereabouts. 
THE COURT: I've already ruled on 
a ny way. Go aheaa. 
VR. PINKSTON: That's correct. In 
case, Your Honor, where the employees of the 
Beehive House did undertake a search, granted i 
was after receiving the notice of deposition an 
those documents were not readily located, we do 
believe that the sanction of default would be 
appropriate, particularly where the documents c 
the information contained in those documents is 
accessible through an alternate source. We wcu 
v_ v_ ^ rL - Weil, hew 
4^ v- ; 
: coras to 
: e e n o e n 
e o e x c e *"> r^ '~
1 
^A. _L ^, C ' co nsiaeratio: 
that there could be reading on this. Your d i e 
had every opportunity to attempt to obtain the 
documents that would truly show what would be a 
effective substitution of documents that are no 
longer available, evidently, and yet he has not 
produced any affidavit from the bank indicating 
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that the bank has the checks. Banks sorr.etirr.es 
return checks, sometimes banks keep checks. K < 
v:e know? What evidence is there in the 
the bank even has this documentation? 
Nov;, what it seems to me you're 
reauestinc is the some additional time to see if 
n e c a n.-: n a. > c u m e n t a 11 o n ~ / <- v - , we acn't know
7 n e time ror cc nsiaeration ci ::.ese 
t c a a v . 
: e n every 
o v n i s o w 








. n a t i': 
n v^  ;. o L . 
PINKSTON 
. s t rom L. li tT *^ : 
THE COURT: But your client hasn't. 
MR. PINKSTON: Mr. Godfrey has not, 
that's correct, the Beehive House has subpoenaed 
those documents. It seem a harsh sanction to 
default both defendants when there are seme 
2 51 documents that have been produced from 
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could be reviewed to determine whether that would 
be sufficient and to determine whether the bank has 
6| 
7'i 
7EE COURT: Okay. Mr. Pinkston, I 
appreciate your argument, thank you. 
MR. PINKSTON: Thank you. 
Kith regard to Mr. Godfrey, 
.hink all that I've heard Mr. 
ry ^u 
.elepnone cr in a face-:c-face 
Ms. Skougard ask the Beehive House :c 
15; ever a year. Is there seme inaccuracy accu: :r.a: 
1
 £i statement? 
MR. PIXKSTON: No, Your Honor. I just 
attempt to look for the documents. I just want to 
clarify that with the Court, that he did himself go 
to the storage facilities and look for the 
documents. 
THE COURT: Oh, he went to the storage 
facilities of Beehive House? 
MR. PINKSTON: Correct, at the Beehive 
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House and the storage facilities at which tht 
^eenive House 
THE COURT: All right. He --
MR. PINKSTON: He --
THE COURT: -- did that on July 10 o: 
MR. ?INKSTON: I'm not sure exactly 
.ate was but he did indeed participate 
ittle too late. 
'. c v e r y , i t L. CX ^ k_/' w : 
^ - v ^ ~ 
O r>~
 0 O ^ * 
; a * * v-* a ; >U1 
t h e n h e 
r e s p o n s e s 
n " c r ' 
a : : e a n< s e t a oeac.1 
v~ r> v- o o v ^ "P u: haven't reviewed that particulcti
my practice. (Inaudible) typical practice, clearly 
they were due in compliance with the Rules of Civil 
Procedure which are -- do not exceed 30 days. And 
it seems to me that Mr. Godfrey has done virtually 
nothing to attempt to comply with the Court's 
previous order. 
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Accordingly, it seems to me that this 
case was filed in November of 1SS5. These issues 
were in dispute at the time of filing of the answer 
and counterclaim in May of 1996. It is 
inappropriate and unreasonable for parties to fail 
to take prompt action in the face of discovery 
reouests. 
Insofar as Mr. Godfrey is concerned, I 
chink :he metier, for sanctions is well taken. I 
think chat it wasn't enouch for the Court to order 
.s cercre 
s c o n a , 
Q *• -v* ^ ' 
on 
wasn't e ven a: 
i_ w — 
. a v, c , 
; *\ T £^ 
z o a o n i s w c r 
. err.pt by him to get even i 
. ves let alone the checks 
D recora on w n I c n to case an y cor.c ~us i c n :r.a: 
there might be alternative documents and I'm not 
going to reach beyond the record to do so. 
I think the request for his pleadings 
to be stricken in this default judgment, the 






v a- a p. "v o ~^ o 
Mr. Rampton, you may respond then with 
:e Beehive House. Go ahead. Do you 
have any reply to the arguments that have been 
made? 
MR. RAMPTON: Your Honor, just briefly 
Mr. Merrill has punctuated in his argument 
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the money? Over whose signature? 
purpose? For whose benefit? That's where the 
checks come in. V,7 e have got to have those checks 
to know what they say. 
Now, it's established by Deanne 
Skougard's affidavit, at least implicitly, that she 
was searching for cancelled checks which means that 
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checks in this case came back to the Beehive House, 
they're not kept by the bank. The best the bank is 
going to have is microfilmed copies. 
Nov;, I've been down this road very 
recently. A handwriting expert can make nothing of 
a microfilmed signature. They want to say, Well, 
we didn't really spend that money, that's a 
forgery. I have no means of challenging that 
without the original checks in my hands. 
THE COURT: When was v^^v 
reer.ive r.ouse r o r t n e s • 
M R. . P. A M ? T 0 X : W h e n 
ou* discovery 
= n t s ? 
; o o 
made to Mr. Godfrey. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RAMPTON: My deposition request wa* 
made in June -- yeah, June 3rd of 1997 for these 
documents to be produced by July 10th. 
Mr. Ralph Godfrey, by his own 
deposition testimony, established that no 
meaningful effort was made to recover these 
documents until July 10th. That was his testimony 
on the record. It was their resoonsibilitv to 
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produce documents before that time. 
We simply have no place to go without 
those records. It's as simple as* that. I'm not 
going to place blame, I'm not going to point 
fingers. That box was in their possession at the 
time when all the defendants in this case knew we 
needed those records, we had asked for them. Not 
e House but of Mr. Godfrey, granted, 
we needed them. 
t's my position that those records 
een in their counsel's office wichin 
-L. -L L t> L r e c u e s ' 
: o n t r o - or 
t n e v v e v a n i s n e c 
• * - O V^ w- * . w. - . ^ jr 
w 6 6 T: 1 V 6 H O U S e 
' e v i e w 
L. I * w 
. ne l c U U -z: ^ ^ 
n o w a v o i v; e s u o m i' o: 
t's a cii6.....ia -. s e e 
1 S 
U K l 
t ne motion r or sanctions insor ar as :r.e ^eeni ve 
House is concerned, I am prepared to rule also. I 
am very troubled by the comment of the Beehive 
House first in failing to timely comply with the 
discovery request that was made in June. It was 
over 30 days before any attempt was even made to 
look for the files. Beehive House knew -- had to 
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have a good faith basis to file its answer and 
counterclaim in May of 1996 and well knew as a 
party to the case that the documents were critical 
to the issue and failed to take adecruate measures 
to preserve wnat 
DOSsession 
they say they had in their 
also troubled by the fact t 
lowed a nonempioyee to sear 
ue s t i o n 
1 9 | 
2 0 
2 l | 
2z j 
2 3 | 
2' 
t n. 
t n e r e i, a u c i i . e r o r e 
subject of a previous sanction order and it does 
stand in some different footing from that of Mr. 
Godfrey. I am going to do this by way of 
sanctions. Obviously, the motion to compel was 
granted as to the Beehive House. Also, the Beehive 
House shall pay ail reasonable attorney's fees and 
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costs incurred in connection with this matter and 
- - or with this notion, argument and post-attorney 
time in connection with the preparation of the 
order on the motion; and shall produce on or before 
September 15 the bank records, any evidence that 
there may be there that there is an alternative 
source of information. 
Nov:, with regard to counsel's concern 
abc ut whether a h a n d w r i t i n a excert c a L — ex. vJ. a. 
however, I will censi: 
• ^ T r - r> a 
s- W ZZ 
Beehive 
- U C K mav rile 
as w e n 
will, whether any additional sanction might be 
appropriate, and specifically whether to strike the 
answer and counterclaim of the Beehive House and 
enter its default. And then it's largely because 
it may not be necessary to do that if there are 
actually alternate documents that can be provided 
otherwise that would effectively take the :e o: 
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the documents the Beehive House had under its 
control and no longer can locate. 
So there must be compliance with this 
order in a timely fashion. If not, as I said, Tuck 
will file aOtion ana .gainst seeking this 
relief. So, that is the order. I'd like Mr. 
Rampton to prepare an order consistent with the 
Court's rulings here today. Are there any 
questions about the nature of the Court's order? 
:«:R. MERRILL: Thank you, Your Honor, 
a o c u t the u o r ^ i < v- - * 
*. a L. — 
^ -> ^ >~ S. ^ r* 
. W w» O 3^ _ > 
• ~ V n 12 S S .< ai.\^.-v to 
p p r v p v
 C C U C 6 m r- ' 
or n e c K s or a r r i a a v 11 s r r o m t n e o a n .< saying t n a t 
those documents will be available? I just want to 
make certain that I comply -- that the Beehive 
House will comply adequately. 
THE COURT: Well, you obtain documents 
that are available on or before that date. As 
(Inaudible) the bank's able to respond to that 
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subpoena in a timely fashion is a separate issue. 
If that becomes an issue, you'd better provide 
evidence as best you can as to exactly what that 
bank has, in what form it is and how readable it 
and give me some basis on which to not enter 
default against your client. 
So, the way this is 
work is: A request is made and the 
"^  u s t succcsed t o comely. It's not 
i s 
- - __ o - i.. Q w . 
;-\ Y- -v- CL i 
• s e z e e s 
•easonacie 
.ttorr.ev' s costs 
attorney's z e e s a n a costs, cy c r c e r . Does t n a t 
answer your question with regard to what you need 
to do? You need to do what it takes to get - -
MR. MERRILL: No, I understand that. I 
understand that, Your Honor, and I appreciate the 
clarificat ion. 







MR. MERRILL: Thank ycu. 
THE COURT: The Court's going to take a 
brief recess before the next hearing. I know we're 
starting a little late this morning but we need to 
take a brief recess while these counsel leave and 
you folks get settled. 
(Concluded.) 
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